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I. Introduction
In rapidly growing numbers, business firms are committing
to meet environmental standards set by nongovernmental
environmental certification programs.Such programs claim
to harness the incentives of the market to promote the public
interest.Th�y typically define the environmental standards
that firms must meet and establish organizational mecha
nisms for achieving and "certifying" compliance. De
pending on the program, firms are entitled to signal their
certification status by displaying labels on their literature,
facilities, or products.Examples of important environmen
tal certification programs include the Forest Stewardship
Council's (FSC's) well-managed forests program,2 the In
ternational Organization for Standardization (ISO)

14001

environmental management program,3 and the chemical in
dustry's Responsible Care® program.4
Although environmental certification programs have
immense potential to reshape environmental management
practices and their affiliated legal rights and duties, Ameri
can environmental lawyers have largely ignored them.It is
difficult to say why. Perhaps they assume from decades of
experience that important environmental mandates neces
sarily come from governments.Perhaps they are constituhttp://www.efi.fip
/ ublications!Discussion_Papers!Ol. pdf(last visited Nov.
28, 2000), or Errol Meidinger, "Private" Environmental Regulation,
Human Rights, and Community, 6 BuFF. ENVTL L.J. 132 (1999), available
at http:/lwww.law.buffulo.edu/homepage/eemeidlscholarshiplhrec. pdf (last
visited Oct. 20, 2000) [hereinafter Private Environmental Regulation].
There are numerous other private enviromnental certification programs.
Many of the older ones concentrate on food labeling, particularly in
Europe. Many of the newer ones focus on particular sectors of
enviromnental management, such as forestry, fishing, chemical
production, and so on.
3. See ISO and the Environment, at http://www.iso.ch/9000e/isoanden.
htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2000). For general overviews, see Bass, supra
note 2; Private Environmental Regulation, supra note 2.
4. The American Responsible Care® program is described at American
Chemistry Council, Good Chemistry, at http://www.cmahq.com (last
visited Nov. 27, 2000). The Canadian program-the first in the
world-can be found at Voluntary Codes-Executive Summaries, at
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ca00797e.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2000).
For a general overview, see Neil Gunningham, Environment,
Self-Regulation, and the Chemica/Industry: Assessing Responsible Care,
17 LAw & PoL'Y 57 (1995).
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tionally different from corporate and securities lawyers,

competitor in the United States, the American Forest & Pa

nongovernmental ordering mechanisms. In any event, the

tive (SFI), has set substantive environmental standards that
mimic the FSC's to some extent, but are more favorable to

who, over the years, have made much more extensive use of

nearly exclusive focus of American environmental lawyers

per Association's ( AF&PA's) Sustainable Forestry Initia

on government mandates is increasingly anachronistic,
given the apparent incapacity of legislatures to seriously re
assess existing laws and the sluggishness of administrative

industrial forest management. The SFI program does not at
tempt to integrate social justice concerns.9

This Article argues that environmental certification

procedural, requiring firms to implement environmental

agencies in restructuring regulatory frameworks.

programs are likely to become important engines of change

in American environmental law, and that they deserve the
serious attention of environmental lawyers. Section II de

scribes common features of environmental certification

programs to date, and compares them to governmental le

The second approach to certification is essentially

management systems (EMSs) with defined responsibility

structures for planning, operations, monitoring, corrective

action, and so on. Thus, firms may set their own substantive

standards, but are required to institute organizational mech

anisms for achieving them. The cardinal example is the ISO

gal systems. Sections III and IV review areas of law likely

14001 program. Its motor is the "continuous improvement"

how they may relate to certification. Section V offers

EMSs will achieve superior environmental performance

to be implicated by certification programs, and describe

some concluding thoughts about the implications of cer
tification programs.
5
II. Environmental Certification Programs

A. Standard Setting
Environmental certification programs seek to verify for a
broader public6 that the activities of certified enterprises are

environmentally appropriate. Of course, the first rub comes

in defining "appropriate." Certification programs follow

requirement.10 The underlying assumption is that dynamic

over time, while facilitating greater efficiency and adapt

ability than substantive standards. It is of course possible to

combine substantive and procedural approaches, and many

systems do so to some extent. The FSC, for example, has a

modest EMS requirement, 11 and the Canadian Standards
Association places heavy stress on the EMS while incorpo

rating modest substantive standards.12

Certification programs generally have formal ar

rangements for setting and revising standards. Programs
sponsored by industry associations tend simply to employ

two basic approaches. In the first, the certification program

the general decision procedures of the associations. Other
programs, such as the ISO and the FSC, have much more

tified firms. The FSC, for example, requires that "forest

tutional structure with an international "general assembly"

sets substantive performance standards to be met by all cer

management shall conserve biological diversity and its as

sociated values, water resources, soils, and unique and frag

ile ecosystems and landscapes, and, by so doing, maintain

elaborate arrangements. The FSC, for example, has a consti

representing economic, environmental, and social interests

in equal proportions, and giving northern (developed) and

the ecological functions and the integrity of the forest." This

southern (developing) societies equal voting power within
each interest.13 It also provides for national and regional leg

dards, which establish concrete criteria and indicators for

standards and criteria, which become applicable on ap

requirement is further defined in national and regional stan

compliance. 7 FSC certification also requires firms to respect

islative bodies to define place-based forest management
proval by the United Nations General Assembly. The cen

applicable environmental laws, protect the well-being of

tral and regional legislative bodies have promulgated a large

S.
This paper occasionally substitutes the term "certification system"
for "certification program." While the term "program" typically refers to a
specific, operating organization, the term "system" refers to its more
abstract structure of actors and their relationships, often extending well
beyond the organization. Many certification programs are based in
industry or trade groups, thereby falling into the "self-regulation"
category as developed by much scholarship on regulatory institutions
(e.g., IAN AYREs & JoHN BRAI1HWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATioN:
TRANsCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); Margot Priest, The
Privatization ofRegulation: Five Models ofSelf-Regulation, 29 0ITAWA
L. REv. 233 (1997-1998)). Many of the newer and most innovative
programs, however, are based on nongovernmental organizations or
technical standard-setting organizations.

7.

workers and communities, and so on.8 The FSC's primary

6. The question of what "public" is the intended audience is often quite
important to the operation of a certification program, but cannot be gone
into here.Potential audiences include environmental activists, cQnsumers,
intermediate manufacturers or retailers, local communities, and society a8
a whole. For a brief discussion of the roles audiences can play in
certification dynamics, see Benjamin Cashore, Legitimacy and the
Privatization of Environmental Governance: Exploring Forest
Certification (Eco-Labeling) in the U.S. and Canadian Forest Sectors,
GoVERNANCE J. (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 8-1 0) (copy on file
with author).

number of rules governing forest management, its evaluaSee Appendix.

8. The effort to integrate environmental, economic, and social justice
criteria in the same standard is of course highly ambitious, perhaps more
so than most governmental regulatory programs.For an analysis of how
the FSC pursues the trilateral agenda, see Private Environmental
Regulation, supra note 2.
9.
See generally Sustainable Forestry Initiative Program, at
http://www.afandpa.org/forestry/forestry.html (last visited Nov. 28,
2000). See also Private Environmental Regulation, supra note 2.
10. See ISO, INTERNATIONAL STANDARD 1400 1 , ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS-SPECIFICATION WITH GuiDANCE FOR UsE
§4.2.
11. Private Environmental Regulation, supra note 2.
12. See Chris Elliott, Forest Certification: Analysis From a Policy
Network Perspective 308-9 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Ecole
Polytechnique Federate de Lausanne) (on file with author).
13. For a thorough description of the FSC structure, see Private
Environmental Regulation, supra note 2.
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tion, and certification, which closely resemble what legal
scholars would ordinarily call legislation.14
Finally, it is important to note that the standards pro
mulgated by different certification systems interact. Some
times systems simply borrow good ideas from one another.
Often, however, they design standards strategically to com
pete with each other. Their competitive strategies appear de
signed, among other things, to attract new adherents, to
blunt the attractiveness of other programs, and to define
master sochil metaphors, such as ecosystem health,
sustainability, and corporate responsibility.1• 5 The standards
must be understood, therefore, as participating in a larger
social dialogue regarding standards for acceptable and un
acceptable behavior.
B. Adjudication and Enforcement

As the broad popularity ofEMSs suggests, certification pro
grams put considerable stress on implementation mecha
nisms. There is broad agreement among programs that inter
nal organizational controls are necessary for firms to
achieve and maintain compliance. There is much conten
tion, however, about what kinds of external mechanisms are
necessary. The FSC has generally taken the lead with the po
sition that independent, third-party auditors are essential.
The ISO imposes a similar requirement for 14001 registra
tion. Industry groups such as the AF&PA and the Chemical
Manufacturers Association have resisted the idea, arguing
that a firm's commitment to meet the standard should be suf
ficient. Over time, industry programs seem to be retreating,
recognizing that self-certification suffers from inherently
limited public credibility. The AF&PA, for example, re
cently instituted a "voluntary verification" program, in
which member firms may arrange for audits by third-party
verifiers if they wish.16
The growth ofenvironmental certification programs
has spawned a growing profession of third-party environ
mental certifiers, many of whom conduct certifications un
der a variety of systems. These certifiers seem to draw their
14. FSC Website, supra note 2. Much but not all of FSC legislation is
applicable to forest management. Some of it also defines how the various
bodies in the FSC system are to operate, as would be the case with
governmental legislation. Edward Rubin, Law and Legislation in the
Administrative State, 89 CoLUM. L. REV. 369, 374 (1989).
15. As in business competition, certification programs also enjoy
strategic possibilities for cooperative agreements, alliances, mergers, and
so on. One ongoing discussion, ordinarily regarding certification
programs in the same sector, concerns "mutual recognition" of one
program by another. Only a few examples have occurred to date, but many
more seem possible. Multi-country certification alliances are also
occurring, as is being demonstrated by the creation of the 14-nation Pan
European Forest Certification Council. See Pan European Forest
Certification Website, athttp://www.pefc.org (last visited Nov. 28, 2000).
Cross-sector alliances among certification programs are also emerging.
One of the most intriguing is the International Social and Environmental
Accreditation and Labeling Alliance (ISEAL), which includes the
Conservation Agriculture Network, Fairtrade Labeling Organizations,
FSC, International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements,
International Organic Accreditation System, and Social Accountability
International, which are seeking to coordinate their standard-setting and
enforcement strategies. Presentation by James Sullivan and Pat Mallet,
Forest Stewardship Council Annual Meeting, Oaxaca, Mexico, Nov. 11,
2000, available at http://www.isealalliance.org (visited Oct. 25, 2000).
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value from a combination of professional expertise, experi
ence with a broad variety of certification cases, and careful
justification of their decisions under applicable standards.
Viewed from one angle, although they would undoubtedly
resist this characterization, certifiers can be seen as 21st cen
tury analogues to the itinerant justices sent out by ancient
English monarchs to ensure that affairs on the land were
conducted as expected.17 From a more prosaic perspective,
they can be viewed as independent contractors performing
adjudication and enforcement functions quite comparable
to those of modern administrative law judges.18
Perhaps the most striking difference between
certifiers and administrative law judges is that certifiers are
generally paid by the firms being certified, rather than by
government. Their independence and objectivity are thus
continually subject to challenge. Given this vulnerability, it
is interesting that environmental certification systems have
not adopted what appears to be the most important mecha
nism for protecting the legitimacy of government regulatory
agencies in the modem era: public access to information. To
date, environmental certification programs have asserted
that their labels fulfill all legitimate public information re
quirements. Pressures for greater information-sharing and
transparency are growing, however, and certification pro
grams seem likely to respond to them over time.
C. Certification Systems and Legal Systems

With their standard-setting, adjudication, and enforcement
mechanisms, certification programs bear a striking resem
blance to government regulatory programs. Yet, because of
their apparently autonomous and voluntary nature, certifi
cation programs are often conceptualized as ''unilateral

16. See Statement of Expert Review Panel Chairman Paul Hansen,l999
5th Annual Progress Report, AF&PA Sustainable Forestry Initiative 2,
available at http://www.afandpa.org/forestry/forestry.html (last visited
Nov. 28, 2000).
17.

See, e.g., S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FoUNDATIONS OF THE
COMMON LAW 25-36 (2d ed. 1981).

18. The certifiers act as adjudicators in that they are charged with
determining whether applicants for certification meet the various
ecological, operational, economic, and social criteria. Certifiers also aetas
enforcers. In the FSC system, for example, they are charged with on-going
monitoring of firms that receive certification, and can revoke certificates if
forest management falls below set standards. As in many regulatory
regimes, considerable responsibility for collecting information and
reporting on compliance falls to regulated firms. FSC certifiers also
exercise a great deal of discretion and judgment in determining whether
individual forest management operations meet the standards for
certification. This is due to both the inherent complexity of forest
management and the multiple environmental, social, and economic goals
of the certification regime. As is often the case with government agencies,
many certification pr«;lgrams have standards and procedures for
accrediting the certifiers who determine whether management practices
meet their standards.
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mined by rules; they also involve the exercise of judg
ment and discretion.21
(6) Sovereign states provide the primary authority and
implementation mechanisms, largely financed by taxes.

commitment"19 programs separate and distinct from legal
systems. In fact, however, certification programs are both
similar to and deeply intertwined with traditional legal sys
tems. In addition to using law to organize themselves and
control their members, certification programs also rely on
the fear of intensified legal regulation to attract participants.
Perhaps more importantly, certification programs can have
a significant influence on the content and implementation

31 ELR 10165

The last criterion is maintained by many,22 but not
all23 legal theorists. It has long faced problems regarding
how democratic a state must be for its rules to qualify as
law.24 More recently, the growth of a global order transcend

of legal mandates. This influence is likely in turn to

ing individual states yet enacting rules that operate like laws

prompt legal systems to seek ways of influencing or regu
lating certification systems. In tracing the paths and

ceive further attention in the conclusion of this Article.

forms that such interactions are likely to take, it is helpful
to start by comparing the basic eleJ;llents of legal systems
and certification systems.

1. Legal

has created problems for this conception. 25 These issues re

2.

Certification Systems

·

Systems

Of course, the definitions of"law" and "legal system" have
been much disputed over the years, and will not be resolved
here. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that there is
. widespread acceptance that legal systems have the follow
ing features20:
(1) Legislative bodies, often representing de
fined interests, make rules governing actors within
their jurisdiction.
(2) Adjudicative bodies determine the applicability of
rules in particular cases. In doing so they often give fur
ther definition to rules.
(3) Enforcement bodies
(a) gather information on compliance with rules,
and
(b) use sanctions (punishments and rewards), to
promote compliance.
(4) The legal bodies operate under rules, ordinarily
governing both their composition and procedures, which
often include opportunities for pubHc participation.
(5) Actions taken by legal bodies are not fully deter19. This categorization reflects the work of the Concerted Action on
Voluntary Approaches (CAVA) project, a European Union-supported
effort to develop a research network and a body of research on the use of
''voluntary approaches" to improve environmental management. CAVA:
ConcertedAction on VoluntaryApproaches, at http://www.ensmp.fr/Fr/
CERNNCERNA/Progeuropeens/CAV Allndex.html (last visited Nov.
25, 2000). See Steven Baeke et al., The Nature of Voluntary Approaches:
Empirical Evidence and Patterns: Literature Survey, CAVA Working
Paper No. 99/08/3, August 1999; ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC
CoOPERATION & DEV., VOLUNTARY APPROACHES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PoLICY: AN AssESsMENT (1999). Certification systems are a special kind
of unilateral commitment program, since they do not claim to be "one
shof' efforts, but rather set up frameworks for long-term policy
development and implementation.

See, e.g., JosEPH RAZ, THE CoNCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1980).

20.

Although western legal terms such as legislation and adjudication are used
here, these terms need not be used within legal systems. The key idea is
that legal systems have ways of formulating rules, determining their
applicability, applying sanctions, and so on.
.....
21. The amount of discretion, however, may often look larger when
viewed from the perspective of rules than when viewed within a social
context including cultural assumptions, shared operating procedures, and
the like. See, e.g Errol Meidinger, Regulatory Culture: A Theoretical
Outline, 9 LAw & PoL'y 355 ( 1987); Edward L. Rubin, Discretion and Its
Discontents, 72 CHr.-KENT L. REv. 1299 (1997).
.•

22. See, e.g., H1-Ns KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE

Although there is no uniform definition of a certification
system, and existing programs that are classified as certifi
cation systems vary considerably, most systems include the
following elements:

(1) Standard setting bodies operating with defined
membership and decision processes. These can be sec
tor-specific industry groups (e.g., the Chemical Manu
facturers Association), general industrial standard set
ting federations (e.g., the IS0),26 or multi-interest stake
holder groups (e.g, the FSC).
(2) �tandards for certification,
(a) These follow either or both of two gen
eral approaches:
(i) Substantive performance standards (the
FSC approach);
(ii) Environmental management system stan
dards (the ISO approach);
(b) Certification can attach to an enterprise, a prod
uct, or both, depending on the program.
(3) Organizational mechanisms for certifying compli
ance of individual firms with applicable standards,
which center on:.
(a) Information systems maintained by firms
(b) Professional certifiers exercising considerable
(1945). Kelsen,like most western legal theorists of the late 19th and 20th
centuries,argued that law must involve a threat of punishment by the state.
23. See, e.g., fRIEDRICH CHARLES VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF
OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE (Abraham Hayward
trans., Arno Press 1975) (1831). Savigny argued that law "is first
developed by custom . . . next by jurisprudence-everywhere, therefore,
by internal silently-operating powers, not by the arbitrary will of a
law-giver." /d. at 30. He was arguing against the creation of a national law
for Germany, and in favor of preserving local variation.
24. See, e.g., Herman Heller, The Nature and Structure ofthe State, 18
CARDOZO L. REV. 1139 (1996); Frank Michaelman, Law's Republic, 97
YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
25. See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay
of Legal and Social Systems, 45 A M. J. CoMP. L. 149, 157-59 (1997).
26. To an important degree, the existence of the ISO and its national
affiliates dates back to a time when the primary purpose of
nongovernmental standard setting was to help buyers and sellers achieve
shared understandings of what standards the products they bought and
sold would meet.
The geographic scope of certification programs varies greatly. The FSC
and the ISO are global. Other programs, such as the Pan European Forest
Certification Council, are regional. See Pan European Forest
Certification Website, supra note 15. The AF&PA is national program
based in the United States. There are also a number of sub-national
certification programs, though they are likely to be viable only in the
narrowest markets.
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site-specific discretion.27
(4) Provisions for public participation 28
(5) Mechanisms for sanctioning non-compliance,29
usually:
(a) withdrawal of certification, and/or
(b) expulsion from membership in a group.
In sum, environmental certification programs have
most of the same basic organizational elements of legal sys
tems. What they generally lack is a command from a sover
eign directing all management organizations in a given cate
gory to achieve certification standards, and subjecting them
to sovereign-imposed penalties for failure to do so. As indi
cated above, certification systems are generally character
ized as "voluntary." Firms subscribe to them because they
determine that it is in their interest to do so. Yet it is increas
ingly common to describe environmental certification as a
"de facto requirement" for doing business in many jurisdic
tions.30 When interviewed, corporate officials often state
that they feel they have"no real choice" but to become envi
ronmentally certified. The reasons they give vary, and in
clude such factors as avoiding intensified government regu

2-2001

might be expected. Moreover, many of the reasons given to
explain the growth of certification have at different times in
history been grounds for expanded government regulation.
It is not surprising, therefore, that complex relationships
might emerge between certification and legal systems.
The next two sections catalog some of the legal chan
nels through which those relationships can operate. Section
III lists legal mechanisms that seem largely receptive to cer
tification systems, while Section IV lists ones that seem
more resistant. It is important to note, however, that most of
the legal mechanisms described below could in principle be
used either to promote or to undermine certification pro..:
grams, or indeed to promote some and undermine others.
III. Legal Incorporation of Certification Systems
Environmental certification programs can be incorporated
in law through a variety of means.33

A. Legal Requirement of Certification

lation, maintaining or expanding· market share, averting
negative publicity, improving community and/or employee

The most obvious means of incorporating certification into

relations, improving organizational efficiency, meeting de
mands of up-stream sellers or down-stream buyers, obtain
ing higher prices, avoiding legal liability, increasing share

erating within its jurisdiction be certified. That legal body
could be either a legislature or an administrative agency
with a broad mandate to achieve environmental improve

holder confidence, and so on. Although many of these rea

ment. There is much to commend this strategy, since it can

sons do not flow directly from government regulation, they

mandate global, state-of-the-art standards, place much of

law is for an authoritative legal body to require that firms op

do suggest a context in which industrial enterprises view en

the administrative burden on non-state bureaucracies

vironmental certification as a mandatory condition of oper

funded by the enterprises involved, and garner some of the

ating in modern society. Moreover, some certified large
firms have begun mandating certification for their suppliers.

political legitimacy of environmental nongovernmental or

Ford, General Motors, and Daimler-Chrysler, fdr example,

ganizations for the government regulatory system. The
downsides include a reduction in government control over

have all established timetables for having all of their sup
pliers ISO 14001 certified.31 In addition, programs such as

regulatory policy (although the government retains the op

SFI require that members undertake to conduct training

potentially higher costs of operation for enterprises than if

tion of imposing and administering its own standards) and

programs for all of the contractors who supply them; they

government agencies bear the costs of administration. 34 To

also encourage "licensing" of non-members who wish to

date there are few examples of governments requiring envi
ronmental certification35: the Brazilian state of Acre re

be certified.32
Thus, the gap between coercive government regula

cently made FSC certification a requirement for practicing

tion and "voluntary" private certification is not as wide as

forestry in the state,36 and Zimbabwe has incorporated ISO

27.

mechanisms as conceived in traditional legal scholarship. Other important
micro and macro dimensions ofincorporation should also be considered.

See supra note 19.

28. Public participation provisions vary considerably among programs
and often seem designed to limit rather than expand the public role in
standard setting and certification. See Private Environmental Regulation,
supra note 2.
29. There is no systematic information on how often certification
systems actually employ.sanctions. My impression from communicating
with knowledgeable sources is that sanctions are rarely imposed.
30. See, e.g., Virginia Haufler, Private Sector International Regimes, 4
PoLIBUS 2 ( 1998); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Private Voluntary
Standard-Setting, the International Organization for Standardization,
and International Environmental Lawmaking, in 6 YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 107, 1 19 (Gunther Hand! ed.,
1 995); Joel Ticknor, ISO 14000: Will It Deter Cleaner Production?, 8
NEW SOLUTIONS 285, 286 (1998).
3 1 . See the news releases collected at ISO 1 4000-What s New, at
http://www.isol4000.com/WhatsNew (last visited Nov. 25, 2000).
'

32.

See Sustainable Forestry Initiative Program, supra note 9.

33.

As is noted in section V, the list is largely limited to "legal"

34. Of course there are contending normative arguments regarding who
should bear administrative costs. One position is that the public should
bear them, since the certification program promotes the public interest in
an improved environment The other is that the enterprise should bear
them, ordinarily through increased costs to its consumers, since it creates
the situation requiring the regulatory program. This is the so-called
polluter-pays principle. The position one takes on these questions depends
on the entitlement structure from which one begins the analysis.
35. Requirements for narrower kinds of certification, such as standards
for pollution control equipment, operator training, and maintenance
programs, appear to be quite common in environmental regulation.
Personal communication, John Shoaff, Pollution Prevention Division,
U.S. EPA (July 20, 2000).
36. Personal communications, Professor Michel Becker, Institute for
Forest Policy, University of Freiburg and Dr. Dietrich Burger, German
Organization for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Frankfurt, Germany
(Feb. 28, 2000).
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14001 into its regulatory system.37 Yet, it seems likely that
their numbers will grow as the certification systems mature
and become better known.

chooses.4 1 It might even suffice for the legislature to reserve

Provided they have broad enough authority, adminis

convened a number of negotiated rulemaking (reg-neg)

trative agencies could also legally mandate certification.
Where agencies are limited to traditional administrative
mechanisms, legislatures could give them added authority
to require certification. Agencies mandating certification
would most likely use rules in conjunction with contracts.A
rule, for example, could simply require specified types of
firms operating in the jurisdiction to be certified by a spe
cific program or by one of several eligible programs.Con
tracts could then be used by the agency to achieve a degree
of control over the certification programs without going
through more cumbersome rulemaking or adjudication pro
cedures. While these methods are being used in some other
areas of privatization, such as prisons and healthcare/8 their
extension to environmental regulation would probably be a
new development. It should be noted, however, that U.S.en
vironmental laws already give a large role to private enforc
ers through"citizen suit'' provisions, which allow interested
parties to bring enforcement actions for violations of federal
or state pollution control standards.l9
In the U.S.legal system, a law requiring certification
by a nongovernmental entity would probably face legal
challenges based on the "nondelegation doctrine," which is
generally held to prohibit the delegation of law makirtg
powers to private actors.4 0 There are several solutions, how
ever, the simplest of which is for the legislature to review the
standards involved and to enact them as its own if it so
37. See Paulette L. Stenzel, Can the ISO 14000 Series Environmental
Standards Provide a Viable Alternative to Government Regulation?, 37
AM. Bus. L.J. 237,276(2000). Whether these examples are evidence that
developing countries are especially likely to adopt private environmental
certification requirements in their regulatory systems can only be known
over time.
38. See generally Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance,
75 N Y.U. L. REv. 543 (2000); Laurent Hourcle & Frederick J. Lees,
Applicability of ISO 14000 Standards to Government Contracts, 27 ELR
10071 (Jan. 1997).
.

39. See generally Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing
Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Analysis of Citizen Suits Under
Federal Environmental Laws, 35 BuFF. L. REv. 834-965 (1985).
Government agencies can exercise control over such actions either by
taking over prosecution of the case or by intervening in the private
enforcement action. If the government does take over prosecution of the
case, the private litigant retains the right to continue participating as an
intervenor. Id.
40. The key decision wasCarter v.CarterCoal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936),
which invalidated a New Deal statute allowing bituminous coal producers
to elect boards to set minimum prices for coal in their districts. The court
stressed the possible conflicts of interests of business representatives
regulating others in their industry. For a contemporary analysis of
delegations outside government, see Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the
Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative
Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 62(1990).
41. Interestingly, one problem that could arise derives from the fact that
many nongovernmental standards are copyrighted. The ISO, for example,
vigorously enforces the copyrights on its thousands of standards and
guidelines. Together with its member organizations, the ISO appears to
depend on the sale of those publications for significant revenue. One can
only speculate how the ISO and other standard-setting organizations

the power to review the nongovernment rules and to provide
for judicial review of them under general administrative
law.4 2 In the case of administrative agencies, which have
committees of stakeholders to negotiate draft rules in recent
years, it is suffi�ient that the agency convene a "balanced"
committee, review the rule developed by the committee,
and subject it to normal agency decisional procedures.4 3
If state or federal governmental bodies in the United
States were to mandate certification, questions regarding
the applicability of antitrust law and. administrative law
would also arise. The antitrust issues, while too in
volved to discuss fully here, could probably be man
aged. In the first instance, many problems could likely
be avoided by providing for competition among alterna
tive certifiers. In addition, U.S. antitrust law has a gen
eral exception for anticompetitive conditions resulting
from intentional state action.44 Thus, antitrust problems
could be managed through clear, legislatively autho
rized policies providing for certifier competition and su
pervised by government agencies.4 5
The administrative law issues raised by mandated
certification would divide among statutory and constitu
tional questions.The main constitutional question would be
whether the Due Process Clause applies to certification pro
cesses. The U.S. Supreme Court has tended to narrow the
definition of"state action" to which the clause applies in re
cent years.46 But it is not entirely clear that the rulemaking
and adjudication involved in standard setting and certificamight respond to government proposals to enact their standards into law. I
am indebted to John Shoaff for reminding me of this issue.
42. This is what the states often have done when privatizing prison
administration. See, e.g., Ira P. Robbins, The Impact of the Delegation
Doctrine onPrison Privatization, 35 UCLA L. REv. 911, 942-50(1988).
43. As authorized by the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C.
§561. The statute requires the agency to exercise somewhat more control
over the reg-neg process than described in the text, but this is not a
constitutional requirement.
44. Parker v. Brown, 317U.S. 341 (1943}(upholding aCalifomia statute
fixing the price of raisins).
45. California Retail Liquor Dealer's Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1980) (defining the clear statement and state
supervision criteria). Absent active and effective state involvement,
however, firms participating in self-regulatory standard setting do face
risks of antitrust liability. See, e.g., Allied Tube &ConduitCorp. v. Indian
Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988) (holding the National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA}, a nongovernmental standard setting organization,
liable for antitrust violations, when steel manufacturers ulied its processes
to prevent approval of plastic conduit as an alternative to steel in the
NFPA's National Electrical Code, which was subsequently adopted by
many governmental bodies). See also FEDERAL TRADE CoMM'N & U.S.
DOJ, GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG CoMPETirORS (Apr.
2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf
(last visited Oct 20, 2000).
46. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 38, at 576-632; Alfred C. Aman Jr.,
Globalization and the U.S. Administrative Procedures Act: Furthering
Democracy and the Global Public Interest, Bloomington Snyder Lecture,
Lauterpacht Center for International Research, University of Cambridge
(Feb. 3, 1999). Social &ience Research Network Electronic Library, at
http://papers.ssm.com/paper.taflabstract_id=176691 (last visited July
19, 2000) (copy on file with author).
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tion processes would be exempt. Thus, it is at least conceiv
able that certifiers would have to meet due process standards
if certification were state mandated. That might not be par
ticularly difficult, however, since due process requirements
generally are not stringent,47 and since many nominally pri
vate organizations have already incorporated comparable
procedures.48 Nonetheless, some certification programs
might be prompted to open up their process somewhat under
the glare of increased public scrutiny.
In the statutory realm, it is quite unlikely that statutes
such as the federal Administrative Procedure Act49 and sim
ilar state acts would be held to apply to certification pro
cesses as currently written. Most administrative procedure
statutes apply only to acts of government agencies. Nothing,
however, would preclude legislatures from making them ap
plicable to certification processes. Moreover, it seems likely
that if governments were to mandate certification they could
eventually be persuaded to subject certification systems to
administrative law-like procedural requirements.50
B. Official Promotion of Certification

Rather than "sticks," governments can use "carrots" to pro
mote preferred policies. Given their ability to avert legal and
political challenges based on delegation of law making
powers while still altering environmental practices, govern
ment-provided incentives could turn out to be the preferred
policy instrument for promoting certification. Several large
U.S. administrative agencies either are considering or ha. ve
made ISO 14001 certification one of their purchasing crite47. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), defining a loose,
three-part balancing test for constitutionally required administrative
procedures. Given its open-endedness and amenability tO highly variable
application, it is impossible to predict what procedural changes in
certification this test might require. There are complex problems in
standard setting organizations, however, some of which do not provide the
equivalent of notice and comment rulemaking, or do limit participation to
those with direct, material interests. See generally John P. Shoaff,
"Business as Usual or an Instance of Reinvention and Privatization in
Environmental Rulemaking? New Rules and Issues With the Use of
Voluntary Consensus Standards," May 25, 1999, at 31 (unpublished
paper; copy on file with author).
48.

See generally Lauren Edelman, Legal Environments and
Organizational Governance: The Expansion of Due Process in the
American Workplace, 95 AM. J. Soc. 1401 (1990).
49.

5 U.S.C. §§500-596, available in

50.

See infra section IV.
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51. The U.S. Departments of Defense and Energy evidently require ISO
14001 certification for first- and second-level suppliers (second-level
suppliers are those who provide supplies to firms that actually supply
products to the agencies). Stenzel, supra note 37, at 270.
52. U.S. EPA, Audit Policy: Incentives for Self-Policing, 60 Fed. Reg.
66706 (Dec. 22, 1995) ("Where violations are found through voluntary
environmental audits or efforts that reflect a regulated entity's due
diligence, and are promptly disclosed and expeditiously corrected, EPA
will not seek gravity-based (i.e., noneconomic benefit) penalties and will
generally not recommend criminal prosecution against the regulated
entity."). In addition, the Federal Sentencing Commission has provided
that criminal defendants with "environmental compliance programs,"
which many certification programs would probably qualify as, can have
their sentences significantly reduced. See ToM TIBOR & IRA FELDMAN,
ISO 14000: A GUIDE TO 1HE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
STANDARDS 226 (1995); see also Organization Sentencing Guidelines, 56
Fed. Reg. 22762, §8A1.2, Cmt. K (U.S. Sentencing Comm. 1991); Draft
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ria.51 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has
promulgated a number of policies that explicitly or implic
itly promote certification. Its enforcement policies, for ex
ample, while not directed solely at certification programs,
indicate that environmental certification will be viewed as a
positive factor in r�viewing organizational compliance re
cords.52 EPA's Office of Compliance Assurance and Moni
toring is integrating EMS elements into its enforcement pro
tocols and settlement criteria.53 The Agency has also used
ISO 14001 in several of its Project XL multimedia permit
ting processes. 54 In addition, EPA has published several doc�
uments and handbooks assisting and promoting develop
ment of ISO 14001-style management systems for both in
dustry and for local governments,55 and has supported re
search in support of the further deployment of EMSs.56
Most significantly, EPA recently instituted a new
"Performance Track" program giving special treatment to
firms meeting certification-like requirements. Tq qualify,
companies must: (1) adopt and implement an EMS, (2)
commit to improved environmental performance, (3) com
mit to public outreach and performance reporting, and (4)
have a record of sustained compliance with environmental
requirements.57 In addition to displaying the Performanc�
Track logo, qualified companies enjoy streamlined moni
toring, recordkeeping, and reporting under the Clean Air
Act (C AA)58 and the Clean Water Act,59 and increased flexi
bility in installing "best available control technology" under

Corporate Guidelines for Environmental Violations, §§9C1.2, 9D l . l
(U.S. Sentencing Comm. 1993). Even the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation has published draft guidance indicating that an ISO 14001
management system will help project sponsors demonstrate
environmental monitoring and management capacity meeting its
requirements for support. See United States International Development
Cooperation Agency (ICDA), Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC), Request for Comments on Draft Environmental Handbook;
Notice, 63 Fed. Reg. 9696 (Feb. 25, 1998).
53. U.S. EPA, DRAFT EMS AcTioN PLAN FOR PuBLIC CoMMENT
(Dec. 20, 1999),available at EPA Reinvention http://www.epa.gov/ems/
plan99.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2000).

54. One of the most recent is with Imation Enterprises Corporation, the
world's largest manufacturer of magnetic data storage tapes. /d. at 15.
55.

See,e.g., U.S. EPA, Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics,
Environmental Management Systems, at http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/

dfe/tools/ems/ems.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2000); U.S. EPA, Office of
Wastewater Management, Environmental Management Systen).s: An
Implementation Guide for Small and Medium-Sized Organizations,

available at Environmental Management Systems/JSO 14001-Publications

http://www.epa.gov/owmitnet/wm046200.htm (last visited Nov. 28,
2000).

56. See, e.g., Position Statement on Environmental Management
Systems and ISO 14001 and a Request for Comments on the Nature of the
Data to Be Collected From Environmental Management System/ISO
14001 Pilots, 63 Fed. Reg. 12094-97 (Mar. 12, 1998), available at USEPA
Federal Register Document http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-GENERAU
1998/March/Day-12/g6389.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2000).
57.
U.S. EPA, National Environmental Peiformance Track, at
http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack (last visited Oct. 25, 2000).
58.

42 U.S.C. §§7401-7671q, ELR STAT. CAA §§101-618.

59.

33 U.S.C. §§1251-1387, ELR STAT. FWPCA §§101-607.
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the CAA.60 How significant this program will be in changing

has put a considerable effort into promoting the use of

business practices remains to be seen. Yet it is important to

!SO-style EMSs at all levels of government, including its
own operations and those ofother agencies,65 although gov
ernment agencies often stop short of formal certification in
order to minimize taxpayer expenses.

note that by requiring improved performance and public
performance reporting, EPA appears to be using it to get
companies to go beyond the bare ISO 14001 requirements.
This could in turn lead to a reshaping of the ISO and other
certification programs over time.
There have been similar developments at the state
level. Before EPA instituted the ·performance Track pro

gram, Connecticut passed an "Act Concerning Exemplary
Environmental Management Systems." 'Fhe Act provides
special benefits to companies that have: (1) registered ISO
14001 EMSs, (2) adopted approved principles of
sustainability, and (3) good compliance records. The bene
fits include: (1) expedited permit review, (2) reduced fees,
(3) less frequent reporting, (4) facilitywide permits for ap
proved firms, and (5) public recognition of having attained
this achievement.61 While it is difficult to track develop
ments like this, other states might well adopt similar legisla
tion. Whether they do or not, it is important to remember that
favorable treatment of certified firms is only part of the gov
ernment enforcement package that will best promote certifi
cation. The other part is effective enforcement of the envi
ronmental laws, which minimizes the relative economic disadvantages of certification for firms. '

'

C. Express Adoption of the Same or Substantially Similar
Standards
As noted above, independent enactment of certification
standards would be one way of avoiding delegation doctrine
problems.66 Because the states and the federal government
share authority over environmental protection, adoption of
certification standards could occur at either level. More
over, it could be done either by legislatures, or by adminis
trative agencies with broad substantive and procedural man
dates. At the legislative level, no evidence of formal adop
tion of environmental certification standards has come to
light during the preparation of this Article.67 In the past,
however, many other types ofprivately generated standards
have been adopted by North American legislatures.68 Given
the inherent attractiveness of ready-made standards, envi
ronmental certification standards seem likely to become in
creasingly important in federal and state legislative pro
cesses over time. As that happens, legislatures doubtlessly

Government agencies can also promote the expan
sion of certification programs by subjecting themselves to
them. A number of state and local agencies responsible for
managing public forests have had their forests certified.
Some have chosen the more environmentally and socially
demanding FSC program,62 others the somewhat less pro
tective AF&PA program.63 The federal land management

will be tempted to change certification standards to reflect
their particular concerns, as they have done with model leg

agencies appear to have no near-term intention of seeking
third-party certification of their lands.64 EPA, by contrast,

At the administrative level, U.S. agencies have a long
history of incorporating privately generated standards in

60. U.S. EPA, National Environmental Performance Track, supra note
57.

for Federal Agencies, 61 Fed. Reg. 54061-54066 (Oct. 16, 1996), possibly
superseded by Greening the Government Through Waste Prevention,
Recycling, and Federal Acquisition, Exec. Order No. 1 3 1 0 1 , 63 Fed. Reg.
49643 (Sept. 16, 1998), ELR ADMIN. MAT. 45 1 00 (stressing recycling
and pollution prevention practices rather than full blown EMSs).

6 1 . See State o f Connecticut, Substitute House Bill No. 6830, at
http://www.cga.state.ct.us/ps99/Act/pa/1999PA-00226-ROOHB-06830PA.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2000). This provision, like much of the other
information in this Article, came to my attention through the "voluntary
codes" list-serve maintained by Kernaghan Webb. This is an invaluable
source of information, and can be accessed at The Voluntary Codes
Research Forum, at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ca00973e.html (last
visited Nov. 28, 2000).
62. Thus far, the agencies responsible for managing state-owned lands in
Minnesota, New York, and Pennsylvania have either achieved FSC
certification or announced that they intend to do so. Margot Higgins, New
York Forests Get Green Thumbs-Up, ENVTL. NEws NETWORK, Feb. 5,
2000, available at http://www.enn.com/enn-news-archive/2000/02/
02052000/certification_9680.asp (last visited Nov. 28, 2000).
63. For example, Itaska and Lake counties, Minnesota. See Sustainable
Forestry Initiative Program Licensees, at http://www.afandpa.org/forestry/
sfilsfi_license.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2000).

64. See Forest Stewardship Council United States, Federal LanQ-Policy
Statement Concerning FSC-Endorsed (:ertification on U.S. Federal Lands,
at http://www.fscus.org/standards__policies/current_issues/federallands.

html (visited July 19, 2000). An ironic part of the problem here is that
national environmental groups have opposed certification of federal lands
because they fear that certification would undermine their goal of a "zero
cut" policy on federal lands.
65. See U.S. EPA, DRAFT EMS AcnoN PLAN FOR PuBLIC CoMMENT,
supra note 53; U.S. EPA, Code of Environmental Management Principles

islation in other areas such as criminal and product liability
law.69 On the other hand, pressure for interjurisdictional
consistency in standards is growing, and privately gener
ated international environmental standards could prove
quite robust. 70

66. , Again there is a possible copyright problem in this scenario. See
supra note 41.
·

67. However, Bolivia recently adopted forestry standards virtually
identical to the FSC standards. Personal Communication, Dr. Dietrich
Burger, Forestry Program, Deutsche Gesellschaft fiir Technische
Zusammenarbeit (German Organization for Technical Cooperation),
Eschbom (Feb. 28, 2000).
·

68. See generally Robert W. Hamilton, The Role ofNongovernmental
Standards in the Development ofMandatory Federal Standards Affecting
Safety or Health, 56 TEx. L. REv. 1329 ( 1 978). State and local legislatures
have also adopted uncounted private codes in such areas as plumbing,
construction, accounting practices, and the like. Id. at 1366.
69. Examples include the Model Penal Code, the Uniform Commercial
Code, Restatements of Torts and Contracts, and the like.
70. The question of how much demand there is for interjurisdictional
consistency is in fact quite complex. While some industrial interests
operating in multiple legal jurisdictions have powerful interests in
uniform standards, others, either operating in a narrower set of
jurisdictions or having more capacity to vary performance according to
locale, have equally strong interests in differential standards, which they
have a comparative advantages in meeting.
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small elements of rules covering larger topics, as in a Fed

coordination in recent years, the going has been very diffi
cult. 76 This could c o n c ei vably mean e ither that

eral Trade Commission rule incorporating the American So

nongovernmental programs have a significant long-term

ciety for Testing and Materials' standard for measuring gas
oline octane in a rule requiring sellers to post octane ratings
on their pumps.71 Other times agency rules are aimed at es
sentially the same issues as the private standards. When the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration began op
erations in 1971, for example, it quickly converted a whole
raft of voluntary health and safety standards into regulatory
requirements.72 Other agencies have done the same.73 It is
clear that EPA has often drawn upon nongovernmental stan
dards in setting regulatory requirements, but there appear to
be no published studies providing a comprehensive over
view ofhow it has done this. In addition, the National Tech
nology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA)
requires that federal agencies "use technical standards that
are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus bodies"
and participate in their development where possible. 74 The
exact reach ofthe statute remains open to interpretation, par
ticularly because it does not define key terms such as "tech
nical standard" and "voluntary consensus body."75 Nonethe
less, it seems likely to exert a steady pull on agency practice
over time.
It is also important to note that some environmental
certification standards might be difficult for agencies to in
corporate, because they include areas beyond the jurisdic
tion of any single agency. The FSC standards, for example,
include indigenous rights, worker safety, and community
economic concerns, in addition to environmental protec

structural advantage over governmental programs, or
that their efforts to integrate multiple concerns are too
far ahead of governmental programs to be attractive to
most industries.
Overall, the quality of legislative and administrative
deliberation in adopting private standards has varied tre
mendously in different situations. Sometimes goyernment
bodies have carefully reviewed, evaluated, and appropri
ately amended private standards; other times they have
not.77 When administrative agencies incorporate standards,
they are subject to judicial review and must produce deci
sional records sufficient to persuade reviewing courts that
their decisions were rational and based on adequate evi
dence.78 The NTTAA may make it somewhat easier for
agency rules incorporating private standards to sustain judi
cial review, since it expresses a general preference for such
standards, and puts a special burden on agencies to explain
decisions in which they choose not to use them.

D. Indirect Adoption Through "Environmental" Laws
Some of the most important and difficult-to-trace forms of
legal change unfold in informal processes. These processes
include broad discussions it;1 industrial, professional, and
policy circles,79 as well as specific transactions among
firms, regulators, 80 and sometimes community organiza
tions. 81 It seems quite likely that environmental certification

tion-concerns well beyond the jurisdiction of any single

programs will affect regulatory programs through these al
most invisible channels, beyond whatever changes are pro

agency. Although some federal and state administrative

mulgated as official policy. Some tacit changes are likely to

agencies have been trying to achieve cross-agency policy

occur as inspectors evaluate practices at industrial facilities

7 1 . See, e.g., National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 95 1
(1974).

76. See, e.g., Errol Meidinger, Organizational and Legal Challenges for
Ecosystem Management, in CREATING A FORESTRY FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY: THE SCIENCE OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 361 (Kathryn A.
Kohm & Jerry F. Franklin eds., 1997).

72. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration's review of
private standards was not always stellar, and it sometimes mandated
standards that were either poorly developed or obsolete, such as a rule
against ice in drinking water that derived from the days when all ice was
obtained from frozen lakes and rivers. On the other hand, it also achieved
considerable successes by using private standards. See Hamilton, supra
note 68, at 13 88-99. Though over 20 years old, .this study remains one of
the few serious pieces of research ever to have been done on regulatory
incorporation of privately set standards in the United States.
73.

See id. at 1399-436.

74. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, 1 5
U.S.C. §3701 (1996). The statute requires agencies to utilize voluntary
standards unless doing so would be "inconsistent with law or otherwise
impractical," and to report decisions not to use such standards to the Office
of Management and Budget.
75. For a careful analysis of the statute and its possible effects on
environmental regulation by EPA, see Shoaff, supra note 47. It is also
important to note that the Office of Management and Budget has
promulgated a revised version of Circular A-1 19, which seeks to provide
guidance to executive branch agencies on how to implement the Act.
Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-1 19, Federal Participation
in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in
Conformity Assessment Activities, 63 Fed. Reg. 8545 (Feb. 19, 1998).
Shoaff's analysis explores a number of important ambiguities in the reach
of the statute, particularly regarding what kinds of standards and
standard-setting bodies are promoted by the statute.

�

77. See Hamilton, supra note 68, at 1 386-87. It appears to be extremely
common for state legislatures to include private standards in legislation by
reference, sometimes providing that changes in the standards will
automatically be mandated by the legislation. Jd.
78. Several Consumer Product Safety Commission rules based on
preexistent standards, for example, failed the 'substantial evidence' test
on judicial review. Id. at 140 1 . Absent statutory directives to the contrary,
agency rules are subject to the nominally Jess stringent "arbitrary and
capricious" standard under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§706(2)(a), though there is disagreement among scholars about whether
there is really any difference between the two review standards.
79. An example is the growth of the field of "industrial ecology." See,
e.g., ROBERT U. AYERS & LESLIE W. AYERS, INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY:
TOWARDS CLOSING THE MATERIAL CYCLE (1996); THOMAS E.
GRAEDEL & BRADEN R. ALLENBY, INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY (1995).
80. See' for example the negotiations described by KEITH HAWKINS,
ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT: REGULATION AND THE SociAL
DEFINITION OF POLLUTION (1984).
8 1 . For a description of community participation, see R. Nils Olsen Jr.,
The Concentration of Commercial Hazardous Waste Facilities in the
Western New York Community, 39 BUFF. L. REv. 473 (1991).
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and question whether firms are following best practices.
Others may come into play when permits go through revi
sion cycles and regulators or public interest groups push for
up-to-date standards. Regulatory officials can also promote
certification standards in their choices of firms to inspect
and monitor. Thus, they might decide to treat certification as
an indicator of strong performance and to concentrate their
enforcement efforts on other firms.8 2 As it becomes apparent
in an industry that certified firms are likely to suffer fewer or
less intensive inspections or to find it easier to get necessary
regulatory approvals, the standard of practice in the industry
would likely converge with that of the certification program.
In the Canadian "strict liability" regulatory regime
certification standards may play an additional indirect role
in shaping regulatory standards. The government can con
vict � firm of a violation simply by showing that the firm vi
olated a standard, without offering any evidence on the
overall quality of the firm's management. The firm can
counter, however, with a"due diligence" defense, which in
volves showing that it exercised reasonable care under the
circumstances.83 At least one Ontario court has treated fail
ure to receive industry certification as failure of the due dili
gence defense.84 Certification standards have also been in
corporated into law through remedies. In another Canadian
case involving a violation of air pollution standards, the de
fendant proposed, and the judge accepted, a remedy requir
ing the defendant to achieve I SO 1 4001 certification. Of
course, such certification was not a requirement of the regu
lations involved, but was incorporated through the equitable
powers of the judge to impose an appropriate remedy.85
Finally, it should also be noted that international en
vironmental law may become an important source of indi
rect incorporation of certification standards. Discussions
about how to implement the Kyoto Protocol for the Reduc
tion of Greenhouse Gasses, for example, include the possi
bility of using F SC forest certification to verify the mainte
nance of carbon retention "sinks,"86 as well as using I SO
14001 management systems to achieve reductions in green
.house gas emissions.87 What role such mechanisms will in
fact play remains open at present, but their proponents are
82. The appropriateness of preferential treatment for certified firms
should not be presumed, however. At present there appears to be little
empirical evidence that firms in certification programs generally perform
better than uncertified firms. In the American Responsible Care®
program, in fact, it appears that participants have reduced their pollution
discharges no more quickly, and possibly more slowly, than
nonparticipants. See Andrew King & Michael Lenox, Industry

Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry's Responsible
Care Program, AcAD. M GMT. J. (forthcoming 2000) (copy on file with
author). The authors hypothesize that this may reflect several factors,
including the possible attractions of participation as a "smoke screen" for
poorly performing firms and the failure of the program to apply significant
sanctions to date. They note that the program is considering taking
stronger action against poor performers and the possibility of
implementing a third-party verification program to replace the current
self-verification program. They also indicate that increased external
scrutiny, whether by government, non-governmental organizations, or
community members, could stimulate significant improvements in the
effectiveness of the program.
83. Kernaghan Webb, Voluntary Initiatives and the Law, in VoLUNTARY
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actively promoting them as important tools for controlling
global climate change.
In all of the above ways, certification programs can
be incorporated implicitly into government regulatory sys
tems without going through formal legislative or
rulemaking processes. They effectively change the defini
tion of proper behavior, and increase the rewards for com
pliance and the penalties for noncompliance with certifica
tion standards. Given the paucity of empirical research in
the area, it is unclear to what extent certification standards in
fact have been incorporated in legal systems through infor
mal processes. Yet it is clear that we need to look carefully at
certification programs in order to understand. emerging re
quirements in environmental law.

E. Indirect Adoption Through "Nonenvironmental" Laws
Environme:ntal certification standards can also be incorpo
r a t e d i n t o l e g a l s y s t e m s t h r o u g h n o m i n a l ly
nonenvironmental laws. This section lists some key areas
where this is likely to happen.

1. Tort Law
Tort law sets standards for liability between parties who
have not dealt with potential liability issues by contractual
or other means. It usually applies to "accidents," often but
not always between strangers. In general, U. S. tort law re
quires parties who fail to follow standards of "reasonable
care" to compensate those who are foreseeably injured as a
result.Certification standards can be expected to infuse sev
eral different areas of tort law.
a. Toxic Torts
The most obvious arena for potential incorporation is that of
toxic torts, which involves liability for damage resulting
from exposure to toxic environmental agents. The agents
are usually chemicals, but can be biological organisms as
well. 88 Certification standards are most likely to apply to the
question of what constitutes reasonable care.Both substan
tive and management system standards have the potential

INITIATIVEs: THE NEw PoLmcs OF CoRPORATE GREENING 32, 33 (R.

Gibson ed., 1 999).

84. See Regina v. Domtar, O.J. No. 3415 (Ont.C.J., Gen. Div.) (1993), as
cited in Webb, supra note 83, at 45 n.S.
85. See Regina. v. Prospec Chems. Ltd., A.J. No. 174 (Alta. Prov. Ct.)
(Jan. 25, 1996), as cited in Webb, supra note 83, at 46 n.7. The judge
required the defendant to post a bond of$40,000 subject to forfeiture ifthe
company failed to comply with the certification order.
86. Forest Stewardship Council, Background Paper for FSC and Carbon
Certification Workshop, available at FSC Website, supra note 2.
87.
ISO Technical Committee 207 Climate Change Task Force,
Application of the ISO 14000 Series of Standards to the Issue of Global
Climate Change, Draft Third Interim Report, June 2000 (Document
Reference: ISO TC 207 CCTF N29R3).
88. See, e.g., Gene J. Heady, Stuck Inside These Four Walls: Recognition
ofSick Building Syndrome Has Laid the Foundation to Raise Toxic Tort
Litigation to New Heights, 26 TEx. TEcH. L. REv. 1041, 1053 (1995).
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for raising requirements. Consider the example of a firm

Just what is unreasonable is hard to define, and depends on

that releases a toxic agent into a community and claims

many factors (common practices in the area, priority in time,

nonliability on grounds that its practices conformed to gov

costs and benefits ofthe use, etc.). It is possible to anticipate,

ernment regulations89 and industry standards. Plaintiffs

however, that in some instances certification standards, par

manage

ticularly substantive ones, could be called upon to define

ment system constituted a failure to exercise reasonable care

land uses as unreasonable. To offer a forestry example

could argue that the firm's lack of an ISO

1 4001

under the circumstances. Such an argument would be diffi

again, stream pollution that results from a clear cut larger

cult for a defendant to counter, especially in light of the fact

than would be allowed by a certification system and that
substantially affects the water quality of a downstream

that a harmful release occurred.
Often the most difficult elements to prove in toxic

owner could potentially be cited as unreasonable, ari"d en

tort suits are injury and causation. Environmental certifica

joined by a court. The same might be true of air pollution

tion systems have the potential to aid plaintiffs in"these ar

suffered by downwind residents from a non-certified chemi

eas too, since they may require firms to gather and main

cal plant. Thus again, certification standards would be

tain data on a broad array of environmental effects. These

drawn into the domain oflaw through general tort standards.

data would probably be subject to discovery by plaintiffs in
a lawsuit in many jurisdictions and could help show chains
of causation and injury. Although some states have enacted
statutes to protect companies from compulsory disclosure
of information generated in preparing voluntary environ
mental audits, such as would be done for iSO

1 4001 certifi

cation, many states and the federal government have not
enacted such statutes. 90
b. Negligence
Certification standards might also change liability standards
for run-of-the-mill, nontoxic accidents. Consider the exam
ple of an auto accident triggered by road damage resulting

d. Misrepresentation
Tort law in the United States has long provided a cause ofac
tion to anyone physically injured as a result ofreasonable re
liance on a fraudulent misrepresentation made by one who is
in the business of selling a product.93 The common-law re
quirement of physical harm is likely to limit the number of
plaintiffs who can bring general common-law actions in
volving certification prograrns,94 but it is conceivable that
some physical harm might result from misrepresentation of
fact such as certification status and give rise to suits outside
of the negligence framework. 95

from slumping earth where a firm harvested timber on steep

In any case, related statutory provisions regarding

slopes. Although government regulations might permit it,
and other firms might engage in similar harvesting, prohibi

misrepresentation clearly provide actions for economic
harm. The most important is a broadly worded provision of

tion by a program such as that of the FSC could be taken as
persuasive evidence of failure to exercise due care.91 Again

the federal "Lanham Act," creating general liability for
commercial misrepresentation of goods or services to either

note that the firm could be liable whether it was certified or
not. Thus, law would operate to extend "voluntary" stan
dards to nonparticipants.
c. Nuisance
General standards for land use in Anglo-Ameiican law are
defined through the law of nuisance, which generally pro
hibits uses of land that "substantially" and "unreasonably"
interferes with the use and enjoyment of land by others.92
89. This is sometimes called the "regulatory compliance" defense. On
the whole, U.S. courts have tended not to defer to regulatory standards in
tort cases. They have been criticized for this tendency in recent years, and
doctrine in the area may be undergoing some change. See generally Robert
L Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEo. L.J. 2049-84
(2000).
90. See Donald A. Carr & William L. Thomas, Devising a Compliance

Strategy Under the ISO 14000 International Environmental Management
Standards, 15 PACE ENVTL L. REV. 85, 191-205 ( 1997).
9 1 . Although the issue is not central to this Article, note that the converse
is also possible. Someone injured by a product or enterprise that met a
privately set standard could sue the standard-setting organization in tort.
Although U.S. courts traditionally eschew such suits, some important ones
have been successful. See Shoaff, supra note 47, at 38 for an overview. See
also Jeffrey Q. Smith et a!., Products Liability Claims Against Voluntary
Standards Developers-An Update on Recent Developments, at American
National Standards Institute Website http://web.ansi.org/public/library/
guides/prod_liability.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2000).

92. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984).
93. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILI1Y §42B
( 1998) ("one engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing
products who, in connection with the sale of a product, makes a fraudulent,
negligent, or innocent misrepresentation of a material fact concerning the
product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by
the misrepresentation").
94.

See id. §2 1 .

95. There have certainly been suits for misrepresentation ofhuman rights
records. One brought against clothing manufacturers operating in Saipan,
for example, contributed to a fairly far-reaching settlement monitored by a
U.S. not-for-profit organization. Monitoring Program: A Plan for

Implementing Settlement on Apparel Production in Saipan, at
http://www.globalexchange.org/economy/corporations/saipan/monitori
ng.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2000).
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competitors or others who are damaged. 96 It seems clear that

assessment ofhow well the burdens of the easement are be

this provision could be used in suits against firms said to be

ing met. Accordingly, it seems likely that drafters of conser

misrepresenting their certification status. It is even possible
that it might be used against firms who claim to be managing

vation easements will discover the benefits of certification
and begin incorporating them in the agreements.

their forests sustainably, but are not certified. Such suits

A second area of property law where environmental

could conceivably be brought by competitors who are certi
fied, and who claim that their competitors are falsely imply

certification could prove important is that ofNative Ameri

ing that they are as well.97 Suits under this provision will cer

legal and customary rights of indigenous peoples to own,

tainly be worth watching! In addition, the Federal Trade
Commission and various state attorneys general have the
authority to brings suits against companies for commercial
misrepresentation, and have often done so. 98

2.

Property Law

Property law in the United States allows land owners to
make environmental management commitments that will
continue to be binding even if the land comes under new

can rights. Principle 3 of the FSC program provides that "the
use and manage their lands, territories, and resources shall
be recognized and respected."100 Certifiers therefore are
likely to be placed in the position of determining Native
American claims not only to land, but also to hunting and
fishing rights, in the course ofcertifying forest management
units. It seems quite likely that they will have to make find
ings regarding Native American rights issues that have not
been adjudicated by courts. It also seems likely that such
findings will have significant effects on eventual legal defi
nitions of native rights.101

ownership. One of the most important forms is the "conser
vation easement," through which an owner, while retaining
possession of the land and the right to use it in many ways,

3.

Tax Law

can make specific commitments to another party regarding
how the land will be used in the future.99 The second party,
which ordinarily must be a governmental or a not-for-profit
organization, holds the "benefit" of the conservation ease
ment. It has the power to determine whether the commit
ments are being met, and to take action to enforce them if
they are not. Certification appears to be an excellent way of
enforcing the kinds of conservation easements that allow
continued management for activities such as forestry or low
impact agriculture, but prohibit overharvesting, reductions
of biodiversity, and the like. Using certification as an en
forcement mechanism would considerably reduce the bur
den on benefit holders, and provide a "neutral," third-party
96. Originally passed in 1946, the Lanham Act's false advertising
provision was amended in 1988 to read as follows:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or ser
vices, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact, which is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake,
or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association
of such person with another person, or as to the origin, spon
sorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commer
cial activities by another person, or in commercial advertis
ing or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another per
son's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable
in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or
is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1 125(a)( l).
97. For examples of the many kinds of suits that have been brought by
competitors under the Lanham Act, see Jean Wegman Bums, Confused
Jurisprodence: False Advertising Under the Lanham Act, 29 B.U:- L.
REv. 807 ( 1999).
98. See Lee Goldman, The World's BestArticle on Competitor Suits for
False 4dvertising, 45 FLA. L. REv. 487, 505-06 (1993).
99. The Uniform Conservation Easement Act defines a conservation
easement as:
(a] nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property impos
ing limitations or affirmative obligations the purposes of

Tax law could also become an important means of incorpo
rating certification in the legal system. Conservation ease
ments, for example, are often donated or sold to conserva
tion organizations for very low prices. If the price received
is less than the reduction in property value resulting from the
transfer of the easement/02 that difference can qualify as a
charitable deduction under federal income tax law103 and
may bring additional tax benefits under state laws. Given
the creativity of tax lawyers in arguing for deductions
generally, it seems likely that other avenues in tax law
will be probed in order to improve the financial benefits
of certification.
which include retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or
open-space values of real property, assuring its availability
for agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space use, pro
tecting natural resources, maintaining or enhancing air or wa
ter quality, or preserving the historical, architectural, archae
ological, or cultural aspects of real property.
Unif. Conserv. Easement Act, § 1 ( 1) (198 1). The easement docu
ment ordinarily defines in much greater detail which uses will be al
lowed and which will not. See, e. g., JANET KIEHL & THoMAS
BARRETT, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK (1988). The
easement is recorded in the file on the property that is maintained by
the central registry in the local jurisdiction where the property is lo
cated.
100. FSC Website, supra note 2. Reprinted in Appendix.
1 0 1 . For an overview of the issues in Canada, see Mark L. Stevenson &
Albert C. Peeling, Legal Memorandum Regarding Principle 3 of the
Forest Stewardship Council's (FSC) Principles and Criteria, Prepared for
the British Columbia Working Group, Forest Stewardship Council, May
10, 2000 (copy on file with author). Although it does not discuss specific
certification decisions, the memorandum concludes that national and
regional standard-setting efforts have not dealt effectively with Native
American rights questions thus far.
102. Conservation easements are generally expected to reduce the market
value of property because they transfer some of its development potential
away from the property.
103. 26 u.s.c. § 1 70(h) (1 994).
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tion in deciding whatto report. 111 However, certified firms

4. Information Regulation
I

As the Lanham Act indicates, U.S. law tends to treat infor

are free to report their status, and many will do so. Such in
formation is valuable both to general analysts assessing the

mation relatively seriously.104 One very important statute in

likely profitability of firms and to green consumers seeking

Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRAY05 law, which

ronmental performance. SEC regulations mandate "gener

file annual reports disclosing names and quantities of chem

tablished by the profession" itself through its own stan

ter.106 Other laws require additional reporting of information

relative su,ccess of this division of responsibility suggests

these statutes is generally avaihible to the public from state

immediately relevant point is that it provides a potential

the environmental arena is the Emergency Planning and
requires users of specified toxic and hazardous chemicals to

icals either stored on site or released into the air, land, or wa

on water107 and air pollution.108 Jnformation reported under

to distinguish between investment options based on envi
ally accepted accounting principles," which are largely es

dards-setting process.112 While the long-term existence and
the potential of environmental certification programs, the

and federal environmental agencies. Although it can bp

mechanism for incorporating certification status into finan

accessibility of this information are likely to improve

be seen. An important trend, however, is that financial re

poorly coordinated and difficult to analyze, the value_ and

cial reporting. Whether and how this will happen remains to

steadily as agencies implement modern, internet-oriented

porting standards relating to environmental performance

tory under EPCRA. 109 Moreover, if certification programs

United States.113 The critique that reporting standards are

information systems as EPA has for the toxic release inven

are currently subject to increased attention and debate in the

deliver on their promise to improve information produc

overly conservative regarding environmental performance

ments may be reflected over time in new rules expanding

both formally and informally, financial reporting may be

laws are likely to be important aids to public and private

tion of environmental certification in the future.

ication programs in firms. By creating external capacity to
compare certified firms to each other and to oocertified

6.

firms to become certified and certification programs to be

trade treaties, including the series of agreements referred to
as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) .

tion, management, and analysis in firms, those improve
public disclosure requirements. Finally, public reporting

appears to be gaining ground. To the extent that it prevails,
come an increasingly important channel for legal incorpora

monitoring of the implementation of environmental certif

firms, it may also provide extra leverage for those pushing
come stringent.110

5.

Trade Law

The United States is a signatory to a number of international

GATT requires, among other things, that "where technical

Financial Regulation

regulations are required and relevant international standards

U.S. financial regulation may be even more reliant on infor

exist or their completion is imminent, Members shall use

them . . . as a basis for technical regulations."114 While this

the economic prospects of firms can be heavily affected by

provision pushes governments to formally incorporate in
ternational standards in their positive laws, GATT is also

has considerable potential to reinforce certification stan

time. By presumptively privileging international standards,

mation disclosure than environmental regulation. Because

their environmental performance, financial regulation also

dards. Corporate disclosures are regulated both by detailed
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations,

and by the general "anti-fraud" provisions of the securities
laws, as well as by state laws. At present, the formal require
ments of SEC rules are not particularly demanding regard

ing environmental issues. They tend to focus on potential le

likely to have broader informal incorporation effects over

GATT may give international environmental certification

programs implicit legal standing regardless ofwhether their
standards are formally incorporated in the laws of member
states. This is especially so because the World Trade Organi

zation (WTO), GATT's primary trade regulation body, has

gal liabilities offirms, and accord firms considerable discre104. One possibly important exception is continuing reliance on industry
self-regulation in the area of electronic commerce. This area remains very
dynamic, and. it is not clear either whether industry self-regulation will
persist or whether it will have a significant influence on other areas.
105. 42 U.S.C. § § 1 1001-1 1050, ELR STAT. EPCRA §§301 -330.
106. /d. §§1 1022, 1 1023, ELR STAT. EPCRA §§3 12, 3 13.
107. See, e.g., the Clean Waler Act, 33 U.S.C. § 13 1 8, ELR STAT. FWPCA
§308.
108. See, e. g . , 42 U.S.C. §§7619, 765 lk, ELR STAT. CAA §§3 1 9, 41 2.
109. See, e.g., the U.S. EPA, Toxic Release
http://www.epa.gov/tri (last visiled Oct. 25, 2000).

Inventory,

at

1 10. The King and Lenox research on the American Responsible Care®
program suggests the polential power of public information reporting in
assessing the effectiveness ofcertification programs. See supra note 82.

1 1 1. See generally John W. Bagby et a!., So How Green Was My Balance
Sheet?: Corporate Liability and Environmental Disclosure, 14 VA.
ENVTL L.J. 225 (1995).
1 12. The standard-setting process is organized through the Financial
Standards Accounting Board, which also has an Emerging Issues Task
Force that deals with problems such as those in the changeable field of
environmental accounting and reporting. See id. at 306-07.
1 13. !d. See also Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange
Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 1 12 HARV. L. REV.
1 197 (1999).
1 14. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 1 5, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lA, in
REsuLTS OF TIIE URUGUAY RoUND OF MuLTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 20, 138 (GATT Secretariat, 1994).
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found it extremely difficult to promulgate rules to date.115
This situation virtually invites international nongovern
mental standard-setting bodies to fill the vacuum as quickly
as possible.

R Forbearance
What does it mean when government legal systems take no
direct action regarding certification systems? Inaction is to be
expected when certification systems are new and government
has little experience with them. After certification programs
become better understood, however, government forbear
ance may begin to take on meaning. Most likely it will be
taken to indicate tacit approval. It could even be seen as an
implicit delegation of regulatory authority to the program. In
pmctice, of course, it might simply be the case that legisla
tures and agencies see more pressing needs for scarce govern
ment resources in other areas. Intentionally or not, however,
government forbearance could grow into a form of tacit dele
gation over time, making it increasingly unlikely that govern
ment will significantly expand its regulatory presence in the
areas. Assuming there remains a societal expectation that
some program is necessary, government forbearance may
thus contribute to the long-term strengthening of environ
mental certification programs. Institutionally oriented ob
servers would see them as having been incorpomted into the
social control system ofwhich the formal legal system forms
a part. That would have been accomplished with the assis
tance of the legal system by its essentially doing nothing!

:rv. Legal Control of Certification Systems
Legal systems can shape certification systems, and not
merely incorpomte them. Indeed, like the EPA Performance
Track Program, many of the legal incorpomtion mecha
nisms described above have the potential to affect the con
tent and pmctice of certification as well. In geneml, certifi
cation systems are likely to be shaped in part with an eye to
how legal systems may react

A. Informal Steering
While government forbearance may be seen as a tacit form
of approval or delegation, it can also be a tactical stmtegy for
"steering" the development of certification progmms. Reg
ulatory officials and certification officials are likely to ob
serve each other's behavior. Government agencies are likely
1 1 5. See, e.g., Marco Bronkers, Better Rules for a New Millennium: A
Warning Against Undemocratic Developments in the WTO, 2 J. lNT'L
Bus. L 547 (1999).
1 1 6. See Shoaff, supra note 47, at 15, 35. See also U.S.

GAO,

CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: NEW GUIDANCE SHOULD ENCOURAGE
TRANSPARENCY IN AGENCY DECISION MAKING, REPORT TO THE
CHAIRMAN,
CoMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES GAO/GCD-99- 179 (Sept. 1999).
1 1 1: The federal government, for example, has passed a statutory
framework authorizing the U.S. Department of Agriculture to regulate the
certification of organic foods. Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, 7
U.S.C. §6501 (2000). The department has yet to promulgate final
standards under the Act, so many states have enacted their own programs.
J. Howard Beales III , Modification and Consumer Information: Modern
Biotechnology and the Regulation ofInformation, 55 Fooo & DRUG L.J.
105, 1 17 (2000). See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CoDE ANN. Sh-19.004 (2000);
IowA ADMIN. CoDE 21-47.1(190C) (2000).
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to be able to affect the substance and implementation of cer
tification progmms to some extent simply by how they sig
nal they "might'' react to them. Of course, this is simply the
mirror image of certification progmms trying to steer gov
ernment policy, but it is important to note the capacity of
government to affect progmms by doing nothing yet giving
signals about what it might do.
Governnients might also be able to steer certification
programs by providing them with technical expertise, by ac
tively participating in them, or by supporting research on
their performance, all ofwhich the United States is doing.116
In particular, they could gather and support the analysis of
data regarding the relative performance of certification pro
grams and firms within them. Governments can thereby si
multaneously hedge their policy bets and enhance the tmns
parency of certification progmms. By thus facilitating in
creased production and dissemination of information, they
may also increase the learning capacity of the regulatory
system as a whole.

B. Direct Regulation
Should informal steerirtg not suffice, governments always
have the option ofregulating certification programs. 1 17 They
might do this in a number of ways. First, they could redefine
the substantive .management standards that must be met by
firms seeking to be certified. 1 18 Of course, such an action
would pose a dilemma for certification programs, particu
larly global ones, and they would have to decide whether to
remain in business in the jurisdiction, try to get the law
changed, ignore it, etc. Second, governments could impose
rules governing the procedures followed by certification
programs-standard-setting processes, certification pro
cesses, enforcement processes, etc. They might, for exam
ple, require more or different kinds ofpublic participation in
certification proceedings.119 They might require the disclo
sure of information that designers of certification processes
planned not to disclose.120 Given the discretion vested in
certifiers · by many certification schemes, governments
might also decide to defme minimum qualifications for
c�rtifiers. In fact, governments could go so far as to develop
public certification standards for private certification pro
gmms! Note that the Connecticut law discussed above car
ries the seeds of such possibilities within it.
1 1 8. It should also be noted that the standards for certified firms could
continue to be different from those for noncertified firms.
1 1 9. Indeed, the U.S. antitrust laws already do so to some degree, by
favoring standard-setting processes that are open, balanced, and transparent
See generally David A. Swankin, How Due Process in the Development of

- Voluntary Consensus Standards Can Reduce the Risk of Anti-Trust
Liability, Prepared for the U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Nat'! Inst. of
Standards and Tech., NIST-GCR-90-571 (1 990); Shoaff, supra note 47,
at 37.
120. Research done for the Administrative Conference of the United
States in the early 1 990s resulted in a recommendation that information of
the kind discussed here generally should be made available to the public
on the same terms as if the Freedom of Information Act applied. See
Douglas C. Michael, Federal Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a
Regulatory Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 7 1 app. (1995).
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There are many more possibilities. Two points
should be kept in mind. First, certification programs per
form public functions, functions that are most often carried
out by government agencies under the types of rules listed
above. Second, such forms ofregulation have been imposed
on other nongovernmental actors with public responsibili
ties, such as medical professionals, 121 accountants, 122 law
yers, and so on. There is no reason to assume that environ
mental professionals will enjoy permanent immunity.

C. Inhibition of Certification Systems

1 . National Trade Regulation
Where industrial firms cooperate to set standards governing
themselves, potentially raising prices for their products or
inhibiting entry into their industry, national fair trade laws,
such as the U.S. antitrust laws, are always likely to be an is
sue. They have received considerable attention in develop
ment of certification programs to date. Often this attention
has been private, with certification organizations seeking
confidential advice from law firms and conducting confi
dential consultations with national · trade authorities.123
Other times it has been public, sometimes when certifica
tion programs explain why they cannot be more ambi
tious, 124 and sometimes when they instruct participants on
how to avoid antitrust problems.125 As noted in Section III,
national trade laws can impose some constraints, but do
not seem to be a major obstacle to certification programs at
6
this time. 12

2. International Trade Regulation
The past few years have seen a major expansion in the power
of international trading institutions, which have used a se
ries of international treaties to impose increasingly signifi
cant constraints on domestic regulatory programs. The
WTO is currently responsible for implementing global trad
ing policy by interpreting and applying GATT and recent
important amendments on technical barriers to trade
(TBTs).127 As noted in Section III , the GATT system is likely
to be an importation mechanism for legal incorporation of
certification systems. It can also pose some problems, how
ever. The main issue facing environmental certification sys
tems is whether they might be classified by the WTO as
1 2 1 . The U.S. health care system, for example, involves a very
complicated mix of nongovernmental regulation by the Joint Commission
on the Accreditation of Hospitals and detailed regulation of the behavior
health care professionals and specific aspects ofhealth care provision. See,
e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Hospitals: Private Regulation ofHealth Care and the Public Interest, 24
B.C. L. R Ev. 835 (1983); Steve P. Calandrillo, Physician-Assisted
Suicide Under Managed Care, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 72 (1998).
122. See, e.g., Daniel L. Goelzer & Susan Ferris Wyderko, Rule 2(E):
Securities andExchange Commission Discipline ofProfessionals, 85 Nw.

U. L. REV. 652 (1991).

123. See, e.g., Webb, supra note 83, at 42.
124. Private Environmental Regulation, supra note 2, at 66 (describing
the AF&PA's decision to employ a voluntary logger training program,
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TBTs on grounds that they seek to differentiate among simi
lar products based on how they are produced. Since the pri
mary targets ofthe treaties are governments, some observers
question whether nongovernmental certification organiza
tions should be covered at all. The TBT amendments do ap
ply to "recognized bodies"; however, this term is not de
fined in the treaty. 128 Kernaghan Webb concludes that an or
ganization like the ISO, with its designated national stan
dards bodies, shoUld be viewed as a recognized body, but
that groups like the FSC should not. This makes some sense,
but is also vulnerable based on the analysis of the paper thus
far. "Recognition" could be given either a broad or a narrow
interpretation. On the broad side, even forbearance from
regulating based on an assessment that a certification pro
gram is performing acceptably could be viewed as recogni
tion. On the narrow side, the WTO could conclude that un
less a government explicitly delegates authority to regulate
in a field to a certification program, it is not a recognized
program. This is another area that will bear watching. The
effects of the WTO on domestic legal incorporation of cer
tification programs could be quite significant in years to
come. And of course, if the WTO is treated as a form of
legal system even though it is not a nation state, we must
ask the question to what degree it incorporates certifica
tion programs.
V. Conclusions
A.

Patterns ofLegal Incorporation

Certification programs are natural targets for incorporation
by legal systems because they have elements of formality,
continuity, and institutionalization that other, ostensibly
one-shot industry initiatives may not have, and also because
they reduce the costs ofdeliberation and enforcement for le
gal bodies. Although the incorporation of environmental
certification programs into U.S. law is only beginning to un
fold, the analysis in Sections III and IV suggests that it is oc
curring, mostly through indirect legal processes. Yet the
process of legal incorporation is very difficult to monitor.
On the one hand, it can occur in so many small steps simulta
neously in so many avenues that it is very difficult to trace. It
can go forward almost unnoticed. On the other hand, there is
a tension between the quasi-legal analysis performed above
and empirical �ssess�ent. The facts that the forms of incorrather than a requirement that all suppliers be certified in sustainable
forestry methods).
125. See Swankin, supra note 1 1 9, at 32.
126. Their primary effects have been on so-called buyers groups, which
are groups of wholesalers and retailer who jointly commit to buy only
certified products. These groups have evidently been constrained in
various ways by trade laws, but no published information has been found
that explains how.
127. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, supra note 1 14, at 6-7.
128. Annex I of the TBT Amendments defines "standard" as a "document
approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated
use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes
and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory." !d. at
157.
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poration described above can occur, and are occurring, do

ter a surprising number of strategic opportunities to affect

not by themselves demonstrate that a widespread change is

the system. Nonetheless, the overall pattern is one of in

taking place. They indicate that larger changes may be oc

creasing control by large, powerful actors, working as often

curring, though, and that it is appropriate to inquire further.

through private governance processes as through state ones.
The growth of a global regulatory system relying

B. Implications

heavily on nongovernmental regulation also raises impor
tant questions about the nature of political legitimacy, and

One of the primary reasons legal incorporation of certifica

whether it might be changing. Received social theory holds

tion is interesting is that it may signal larger shifts in social

that to survive governance systems must establish signifi

governance structures. The challenge is to grasp the dimen

cant claims to legitimacy with the public. For perhaps two

sions of the change that are likely to be most important. To

centuries governments have enjoyed a virtual monopoly on

date, most analysis has focused on · questions 'such as
whether voluntary environmental programs yield environ

nongovernmental environmental regulatory systems estab

mental performance better than would have occurred other
wise, and whether they improve cost-effectiveness. Al
though the answers vary with specific cases, they seem to in
cline toward a cautious "yes."129 Provided certain safe
guards are present, such as transparency and watchdog
groups with the ability to monitor activities, environmental
0
and efficiency gains can be achieved. 13 And, of course, the
·

fact that these gains are possible may be what impels the
establi shment o f c ertifi cation systems and other
nongovernmental initiatives in the first place.
Yet, other dimensions of change may be equally or
more important. For example, the proliferation and
institutionalization of certification systems may signal a
general shift in political power from some actors to others.
Who exactly is gaining and losing power? Cutler, Haufler,
and P orter,

who have

studi e d the

growth o f

nongovernmental authority in a number of sectors, conclude
that traditional nation states are clearly losing ground, while
corporate industrial interests are gaining. 131 They argue that
this shift is bringing a diminution of public participation and
accountability. 132 In their even more expansive ·study,
Braithwaite and Drahos agree that many nation states are
losing ground to corporations and self-regulatory organiza
tions in the emerging global regulatory system.133 They see
the system as fluid and highly variable, however, depending
on the particular area of regulation and problem. Actors pur

l e g i timate regul atory authori ty. H o w then do
lish and maintain legitimacy? One possibility, of course, is
that they don't, because people simply do not understand
how they work or how important they are. While this is true
of some systems, which pretend to seek transparency while
thwarting it in practice, it is not true of all of them. The ones
reviewed in the research underlying this paper seem to be
moving on the whole toward increased transparency. More
over, they seem to enjoy growing public legitimacy and
great confidence that it will continue to grow. It is therefore
important to ask whether a new form of legitimacy may be
emerging,· one that is not based primarily on political pro
cesses managed by government.134 If so, perhapsjt is based
on the certification systems' peculiar combination of com
mitments to laudable but diffuse goals, high expertise, se
lective stakeholder participation, and independence from
government. Plausible or not, this kind ofhypothesis has re
ceived only the most preliminary exploration to date.135 If
nongovernmental environmental certification systems
flourish, such questions will have to be addressed.136
Fourth, as suggested above, voluntary agreements,
certification programs, and legal incorporation may and
perhaps should be seen in connection to larger develop
ments in society. There has been a certain amount of work
attempting to make such linkages to government legal insti
tutions. Some approaches focus more on discursive pro

sue their agendas in significant part by hashing out guiding
principles, and even relatively small-scale players encoun-

cesses in society, 137 while others focus on organizational

129. See, e.g., VOLUNTARY APPROACHES IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
(Carlo Carraro & Francois Leveque eds., 1999). See also the papers
collected at Second CAVA Workshop on the Efficiency of Voluntary
. Approaches to Environmental Policy, at http://www.akf.dk/cavalwp.htm
(last visited Nov. 28, 2000).

AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 1 3 1 . Private
Authority and International Affairs focuses primarily on Weberian

130. VoLUNTARY APPROACHES IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note
129, at 10.
1 3 1 . PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 369-70 (A.
Claire Cutler et al. eds., 1 999).
132. Jd.

....
133. JoHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS
REGULATION (2000). They see the United States and the European Union,
however, as still the most powerful actors in the global regulatory system.
134. It is important to note, however, that many certification programs
incorporate and build on legal requirements, often making it more likely
that they will be met. Therefore their legitimacy cannot be treated as
entirely separate from government authority.
135. Important exceptions include Cashore, supra note 6, and PRIVATE

structures and patterns of relationships.138 The next step is to

authority structures, which are probably more closely linked to nation
states than is optimal for understanding the certification systems described
here. Cashore focuses on generic modes of establishing and maintaining
legitimacy, which are available to all types of networked social
organizations, including certification systems.
136. It should also be noted that the question of legitimacy plagues both
private certification systems and supranational governmental entities,
such as the WTO and the European Union, which also stand in some
tension with nation states. See, e.g., Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic

Legitimacy and the Administrative Character ofSupranationalism: The
Example ofthe European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 628 (1999).
137. See, e.g., Teubner, supra note 25.
1 38. See, e.g., David M. Trubek et al., Global Restructuring and the Law:
Studies of the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of
Transnational Arenas, 44 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 407 (1994) (emerging

systemic relationships, particularly the growth of a global trading order,
may drive changes in both private and public legal orders).
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extend those theoretical constructs to nongovernmental reg
ulatory systems, and to adapt them as appropriate.

7. A management plan-appropriate to the scale and inten
sity of the operations-shall be written, implemented, and

Finally, it may be time to revisit the meaning of"law"

kept up to date. The long-term objectives of management,

and "legal system." As the discussion of international trade

and the means of achieving them, shall be clearly stated.

law suggested, the role of the nation state and state-based
law is becoming increasingly problematical. It is being chal

8. Monitoring shall be conducted-appropriate to the scale

lenged from one side by the growth of a global trading sys

and intensity of forest management-to assess the condi

tem with an accompanying transnational legal system, and
from the other by the growth of nongovernmental, often

tion of the forest, yields of forest products, chain of cus
tody, management activities, and their social and environ

global regulatory mechanisms such as the certification sys

mental impacts.

tems. Yet the two supposedly defining characteristics ofcer
tification systems, their privateness and their voluntariness,

9. Management activities in high conservation value forests

are highly contingent. They are under serious threat as a re
sult of the linkages of certification systems to national and

forests. Decisions regarding high conservation value for

transnational legal systems. They could turn into their oppo

ests shall always be considered in the context of a precau

sites before we really notice it. If so, perhaps they were not

tionary approach.

shall maintain or enhance the attributes that define such

what they seemed.
1 0. Plantations shall be planned and managed in accordance
withPrinciples and Criteria 1 -9, and Principle 10 and its Cri
Appendix

teria. While plantations can provide an array of social and
economic benefits, and can contribute to satisfying the

Examples of Forest Stewardship

world's needs for forest products, they should complement

Council Principles and Standards

the management of, reduce pressures on, and promote the
restoration and conservation of natural forests.

The Forest Stewardship Principles and Criteria, applicable
around the world, are as follows139:

Exemplifying the countless standards and indicators imple

1 . Forest management shall respect all applicable laws of

Maritime Region regarding biodiversity that were promul

the country in which they occur, and international treaties

gated as a regional application of Principle

menting the principles and criteria are those of the Canadian

and agreements to which the country is a signatory, and
comply with all FSC Principles and Criteria.

2. Long-term tenure and use

.
rights to the land and forest

resources shall be clearly defined, documented, and le
gally established.

3. The legal and customary rights of indigenous peoples to
own, use, and manage their lands, territories, and resources
shall be recognized and respected.

4. Forest management operations shall maintain or enhance
the long-term social and economic well-being of forest
workers and local communities.

5 . Forest management operations shall encourage the effi
cient use ofthe forest's multiple products and services to en
sure economic viability and a wide range of environmental
and social benefits.

6.

Forest management shall conserve biological diversity

and its associated values, water resources, soils, and
unique and fragile ecosystems and landscapes, and, by so
doing, maintain the ecological functions and the integrity
of the forest.

139. FSC Website, supra note 2.
140. Canadian Maritime Regional Initiative of the Canadian FSC

6

above140:

6.2

• Safeguards shall exist which protect rare, threat
ened, and endangered species and their habitats (e.g.
nesting and feeding areas). Conservation zones and pro
tection areas, appropriate to the scale and intensity of
forest management and the uniqueness ofthe affected re
sources, shall be established. Inappropriate hunting,
fishing, trapping and collecting shall be controlled.

6.2.1 • Threatened and endangered species (listed by
provincial and federal endangered species legislation)
and their habitat must be protected or managed in ac
cordance with approved recovery plans. Where recov
ery plans are not yet approved, disturbance of known
occurrences of such species is to be avoided and a cau
tionary approach taken to protect their habitat. Forest
owner/manager activities must ensure that species
that are rare, vulnerable or under investigation by
COSEWIC [Committee on the Status of Endangered
Wildlife in Canada], or their provincial equivalents as
designated by recognized authorities (e.g. academic
experts, provinc i al o r national museums or
COSE WIC) are not further threatened by timber or
non-timber activities.

Indicators:
Areas are inventoried for such species before harvest
ing, stand improvement or road-building activities
are carried out (appropriate to the scale and intensity
of the operation). Protection of such species is ad
dressed in the management plan. Known occurrences
of such species and their habitat are not disturbed.
Working Group, Certification Standards for Best Forestry Practices in
the Maritime Forestry Region, at http://www.web.net/fscca/standard.
htm#anchor79303 (visited 12/17/00).
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Forest workers are aware of known occurrences of
such species and are following the management plan
with respect to protecting such species and their habi
tat. Management staff is aware of those species that
may occur locally.
6.2.2

*

Old growth stands must not be harvested.

Indicators:
Inventories are carried out to identify old growth
stands (appropriate to the scale and intensity of the
operation). Old growth stands are identified on
management plan maps. No evidence ofharvesting
old growth stands exists. Management and forest
workers are aware of the characteristics of old
growth stands.

3 1 ELR 10179

6.2.3 • Areas with unusually high native species or eco
system diversity must be identified, and protected or
managed in such a way as to ensure that the diversity is
not lost.
Indicators:
Management has identified areas with unusually high
native species or ecosystem diversity using the latest
regional methodology, formulae, and/or techniques
(e.g. those used by W WF, Greater Fundy Ecosystem
Research Group or New Brunswick Nature Trust).
Such areas are identified on management plan maps.
Management plans detail measures to ensure the di
versity ofsuch sites is not lost. Forest workers are fol
lowing the management plan measures to ensure the
diversity of such sites is not lost.

